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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1993 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(1) imposes automatic disclosure and is the most controversial
formal proposal to revise the Federal Rules ever developed. The
tProfessor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank.Peggy Sanner for
valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this
Essay, and the Harris Trust and Ann & Tom Boone for generous, continuing
support. I am a member of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for the
U.S. District Court for the District of Montana; however, the views expressed
here and the errors that remain are mine.
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provision requires litigants to divulge information that is important
to their cases before commencing formal discovery. The
amendment also permits all ninety-four federal districts to vary the
revision or to reject it completely. Moreover, judges and parties in
specific cases may modify any disclosure requirements adopted by
the districts.
The amendment has remained controversial since it became
effective on December 1, 1993. Less than a majority of districts
subscribe to the Federal Rule revision, and many of the remaining
courts prescribe a broad array of disclosure procedures. These
procedures include requirements that are somewhat stricter and
considerably less rigorous than the Federal Rule amendment.
The applicable strictures, therefore, foster substantial
interdistrict court and intrastate disuniformity. Moreover, the
disclosure requirements appear in local rules, civil justice expense
and delay reduction plans issued under the Civil Justice Reform Act
(CJRA) of 1990, district court orders, individual judge procedures,
and unwritten informal practices. These considerations complicate
federal civil practice because the disclosure strictures are difficult to
locate, understand, and satisfy. Furthermore, they vary significantly
from district to district and within states.
All these factors mean that early implementation of automatic
disclosure warrants analysis. This Essay undertakes that effort by
emphasizing the process problems raised by disclosure. First, it
examines the origins and development of the automatic disclosure
mechanism. The Essay then evaluates the effectuation of disclosure,
focusing on the disuniform disclosure procedures adopted by the
federal district courts and the state and territorial court systems
located within the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
This Essay ascertains that disclosure has enhanced interdistrict
federal court disuniformity. For example, a mere two of the fifteen
districts subscribe to the Federal Rule requirements. Disclosure has
also increased intrastate disuniformity. For instance, the federal
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courts in multi-district states have instituted diverse disclosure
regimes. Indeed, each of the four federal districts in California
prescribe different disclosure procedures. Alaska and Arizona are
the only two of eleven state or territorial court systems that apply
disclosure. This Essay next assesses the implications of these
findings regarding the implementation of disclosure, and concludes
with suggestions for the future.
II. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE AUTOMATIC
DISCLOSURE PROCEDURE

Increasing concern about numerous difficulties with discovery
and its abuse prompted the Federal Advisory Committee on the
Civil Rules (Advisory Committee) to issue a preliminary draft
proposal providing for automatic disclosure in 1991.1 The Advisory
Committee suggestedFRCP 26 (a)(1), which represented a dramatic
departure from traditional discovery, although minimal empirical
information indicated that there was widespread discovery abuse,
and the procedure had received comparatively little prior
experimentation.2 Passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
1. I rely substantially in this section on Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and
1990fudicialimprovementsActs, 46 STAN.L.REV. 1589, 1609-13 (1994). See, e.g.,

Committee on Discovery, New York State Bar Association Section on
Commercial and Federal Litigation, Report on Discovery Under Rule 26{b}(1), 127
F.R.D. 625 (1990); see also Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579;
Ralph K. Winter, In Defense ofDiscovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263 (1992).
But see Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: 1be Pervasive Myth ofPervasive
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1393 (1994).
2. See Mullenix, supra note 1; Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? A
Comment on john Setear's THE BARRISTER AND THE BOMB, 69 B.U. L. REV. 649
(1990); see also Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery- 1be Rush
to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 30 {1993) (noting three federal districts had
experimented with automatic disclosure); Wayne D. Brazil, 7be Adversary
Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 V AND. L.
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correspondingly evidenced congressional intent that considerable
testing precede major discovery reform. 3
The preliminary draft proposal would have mandated that
plaintiffs and defendants divulge prior to formal discovery
information that was likely to "bear significantly on any claim or
defense. "4 Practically all of the more than twenty Early
Implementation District Courts (EIDCs) designated under the 1990
legislation that instituted automatic disclosure relied substantially
on the phrasing in this preliminary draft proposal. 5
The automatic disclosure amendment ultimately engendered
greater controversy than any formal proposal to revise the Federal
Rules. 6 In a lengthy public comment period and in hearings,
virtually all elements of the organized bar and numerous additional
interests strongly criticized the preliminary draft proposal.7 These
opponents thought that the procedure failed to clearly delineate
disclosure requirements and that it would add an additional layer

REV. 1295, 1361 (1978) (demonstrating the earliest advocates recommending
adoption of a national rule only after considerable experimentation); William W.
Schwarzer, 1be Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Refonn, 50 U.
PITI. L. REV. 703, 723 (1989).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. 1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. 1993)
(affording guidance to district courts for conducting experimental programs and
prescribing experimentation with discovery). See generally Carl Tobias, In Defense
ofExperimentation with Automatic Disclosure, 27 GA. L. REV. 665, 667-68 (1993).
4. See Committee on Rules ofPractice and Procedure ofthe judicial Conference
ofthe United States Proposed Rules: Preliminary Draft ofProposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules ofEvidence, 137 F.R.D.
53, 87-88 (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft].
5. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA, CIVIL
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 15-16 (1991); U.S. DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 5, 1991WL525112, at *5 (C.J.R.A.). The dearth
of disclosure models probably led the districts to depend substantially on the
phrasing of the Committee's preliminary draft.
6. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1605.
7. See Bell et al., supra note 2, at 28-32.
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of discovery, create ethical problems, and impose cost and delay. 8
At the end of a February 1992 public hearing, the Advisory
Committee decided to omit the disclosure draft, apparently
choosing to defer the consideration of the procedure until the
completion of disclosure experimentation, which was ongoing
under the CJRA in many federal districts.9 The Committee seemed
to prefer the selective local application of the procedure over the
national implementation of the controversial, nascent measure. 10
This view was short-lived. In April 1992, the Advisory
Committee revitalized its preliminary draft and required that
litigants disclose the names of all individuals who are likely to have
"discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the
information" and "all documents, data compilations, and tangible
things" that are relevant to disputed facts. 11 The Committee
seemingly attempted to accommodate CJRA experimentation by
authorizing districts to vary the amendment or to reject it totally. 12
The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Evidence (Standing Committee) and the Judicial Conference of the
United States, additional entities responsible for rule revision,
approved the Advisory Committee proposal, notwithstanding
continuing opposition. The United States Supreme Court tendered
the disclosure amendment without modification to Congress, with

8. Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, in 145 F.R.D. 139,
141 {1993); Tobias, supra note 1, at 1612.
9. See Bell et al:, supra note 2, at 34-35; Winter, supra note 1, at 268; 145
F.R.D. at 141; see also Randall Sambom, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited:
Committee Debates Further Amendments, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1992, at 1, 12.
10. See Bell et al., supra note 2, at 34-35; Sambom, supra note 9, at 12.
11. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Effective Dec. 1,
1993, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401-431 (1993) [hereinafter Amendments].
12. See Bell et al., supra note 2, at 35-39. But see Winter, supra note 1, at 269
{observing that the revised proposal responded to the legitimate concerns of
critics).
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three Justices dissenting from transmittal. 13
Once Congress received the revision, nearly all segments of the
bar and numerous other interests attempted to persuade Congress
to omit disclosure. 14 Both Houses of Congress conducted hearings
on the disclosure amendment, and a bill which would have deleted
disclosure passed the House by voice vote. 15 The Senate
unexpectedly failed to consider the legislation, and the disclosure
revision took effect on December 1, 1993. 16
The Senate's inaction fostered uncertainty and consternation in
the federal districts, particularly in the significant number of courts
attempting to comply with the December deadline by which the
CJRA mandated that they adopt civil justice expense and delay
reduction plans and on which the federal disclosure changes became
effective. 17 Because a number of districts believed that Congress
would omit disclosure, some courts did not anticipate other
possibilities and needed to make last-minute determinations
respecting the amendment. 18
These districts and numerous EIDCs, most of which had
adopted disclosure procedures that varied from the federal
requirements, 19 responded in diverse ways. Many courts issued or
13. See Amendments, supra note 11, at 401-03.
14. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1612.
15. See William J. Hughes, Reflections from the House: Congressional Reaction
to the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, 18 SETON HALL
LEGIS.J. 1, 3-4, 9-11 (1993) (discussing hearings); see also H.R. 2814, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) (bill deleting disclosure); 139 CONG. REC. H8744-47 (daily ed.
Nov. 3, 1993) (passing by voice vote).
16. See Randall Sambom, Bill to Stop Change Dies: New Discovery Rules Take
Effect, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 3, 40; see also Randall Samborn, Derailing the
Rules, NAT'LL.J., May 24, 1993, at 1, 33.
17. See Carl Tobias, Automatic Disclosure: Let It Be, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 30,
1994, at 25; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 2074 (Supp. 1993) (providing statutory
deadlines).
18. See Tobias, supra note 17, at 25.
19. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also DONNA STIENSTRA,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN UNITED
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revised civil justice plans, published orders, or prescribed new or
amended existing local rules. 20 A number of non-EIDCs eschewed
the federal changes, promulgated provisions that differed from that
revision, or suspended the federal requirements pending additional
study.21 A majority of the districts ultimately chose not to apply the
new federal modifications.22
The above developments engendered confusion in the federal
districts. Inconsistent procedures complicated practice for federal
court attorneys and parties, especially for those who litigate in
more than one district. Many parties encountered problems
discovering applicable procedures; determining which requirements
were relevant, what they meant or when the strictures took effect;
and conforming to disclosure. These complexities even prompted
calls for moratoria on national rule revision until evaluation of
local procedural experimentation under the CJRA was concluded.23
By mid-1994, however, a number of districts had instituted and
publicized approaches to disclosure that clarified some of the
STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1995) (affording survey of 94 districts' treatment of
disclosure).
20. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1614.
21. See, e.g., E.D. LA. R. 606E (amended Dec. 1, 1993 and Dec. 12, 1994); D.
ME. R 18(g); see also STIENSTRA, supra note 19; John F. Rooney, Discovery Rule
Lacks Unifonnity, Is "Source ofConfasi,on": Critics, CHI. DAILYL. BULL., Apr. 23,
1994, at 17. Numerous EIDCs retained different forms of disclosure that diverge
from the federal requirements or continued eschewing disclosure. See, e.g., U.S.
District Coun for the District of Montana, Order Gan. 25, 1994) [hereinafter
Montana Order]; U.S. District Coun for the Northern District of Georgia,
Order (Feb. 26, 1994).
22. See Half ofDistricts Opt Out of New Civil Rules, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28,
1994, at 5; see also STIENSTRA, supra note 19; Rooney, supra note 21.
23. See Letter from EdwinJ. Wesely, Chair, Advisory Group for the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New Yark, to Joseph F. Spaniol,
Jr., Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States (Feb. 1, 1992) (on file with author); Stephen B.
Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Refonn: A Call for a Moratorium, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 841, 856 {1993).
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difficulties. 24
In short, this assessment of the early implementation of
automatic disclosure shows that it significantly increased
inconsistency in federal and state civil procedure while enhancing
complexity, confusion, expense, and delay. This examination was
necessarily broad, general, and national. Because greater specificity
should enhance comprehension of disclosure's effectuation, the next
section evaluates implementation in the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth
Circuit was chosen because it is the largest circuit geographically,
encompasses the greatest number of districts, and may confront
more problems when courts within its purview implement a
procedure like automatic disclosure. 25

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURE IN THE
NINTH CIRCUIT

A. Federal District Courts
A survey of the fifteen federal district courts in the Ninth
Circuit indicates that they have adopted disclosure measures that
vary substantially. These range from five districts that prescribe
whole cloth the Federal Rule amendment, to a like number of
districts that effectively eschew the federal disclosure requirements
completely. 26 Practically all the remaining districts reject some
significant aspect of disclosure, such as Rule 26{a){l), which requires
the disclosure of important information, or Rule 26{t), which
commands lawyers and litigants to meet and confer, ostensibly
24. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1614-15.
25. See Arthur D. Hellman, ]umboism and Jurisprudence: 1be 1beory and
Practice ofPrecedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541 (1989).
26. The five districts prescribing the Federal Rule are Alaska, Arizona,
Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Eastern Washington. The districts
effectively eschewing it are Eastern and Southern California, Hawaii, Nevada,
and Western Washington. See STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 7-24.
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helping them resolve disagreements. 27
A few of the Early Implementation District Courts that initially
adopted forms of disclosure premised on the Advisory Committee•s
1991 preliminary draft proposal continue to apply similar
procedures.28 An analogous number of EIDCs attempted to
conform their disclosure requirements more closely to the Federal
Rule amendment, which became effective on December 1, 1993.29
Nearly half of the non-EIDCs essentially rejected the Federal Rule
revision. 30 Most of the remaining non-EIDCs that implemented
automatic disclosure relied substantially on the Federal Rule
requirements.31
The federal districts in California and Washington, the two
states that include multiple districts, also have disparate
procedures.32 Perhaps most problematic, all four federal districts in
California have promulgated and enforced different disclosure
regimes.33 A number of judges in the Northern District of
California have even applied diverse disclosure procedures to
specific categories of cases.34 Moreover, judges in a few districts have
27. These districts include Central California, Hawaii, and Oregon. See
STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 8, 11, 16, 20.
28. These districts include Eastern California and Oregon. See STIENSTRA,
supra note 19, at 8, 20; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
29. These districts include Alaska, Idaho, and Montana. See STIENSTRA, supra
note 19, at 7, 11, 16.
30. These districts include Hawaii, Nevada, and Western Washington. See
STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 11, 16, 24.
31. These districts include Arizona, Guam, and the Northern Mariana
Islands. See STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 7, 11, 19.
32. See STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 8-9, 24. California has Central, Eastern,
Northern, and Southern Districts, while Washington has Eastern and Western
Districts.
33. See STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 8-9; see also note 57 infra and
accompanying text (finding that the Second Circuit's four New York Districts
have fewer discrepancies in disclosure procedures).
34. See U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 17-22
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employed different disclosure requirements within their districts. 35
Most of the EIDCs indicated which disclosure procedures
would apply by issuing general or special orders announcing their
disposition,36 while a f~w courts amended applicable local rules or
civil justice expense and delay reduction plans or intimated that
they would probably do so after additional study of the new federal
changes. 37 Lawyers and litigants, especially attorneys and parties
who were located outside of specific districts, may have
encountered difficulty securing these orders. For instance, the
Montana District circulated a Uniform Order to members of the
Federal Bar in January 1994. The order was intended to tailor the
court's disclosure requirements more precisely to the 1993 Federal
Rule modification.38 The order was also meant to be temporary,
pending the receipt of recommendations for improving civil justice
reform from the CJRA Advisory Group and the completion of the·
court's annual assessment.39
The Judicial Improvements Act GIA) of 1988 imposes an
affirmative obligation on circuit judicial councils to periodically
review all local procedures for consistency with the Federal Rules.
The Act further authorizes the councils to abrogate or modify any
conflicting requirements. 40 The 1990 CJRA correspondingly assigns
{1991); see also STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 8-9.
35. For example, judicial officers in the divisions of the Montana District
either do not apply automatic disclosure or they enforce judicial disclosure
differently. See Carl Tobias, Updating Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 54
MONT. L. REV. 89, 92-93 (1993); see also Carl Tobias, More on Federal Civil justice
Reform in Montana, 54 MONT. L. REV. 357, 362 {1993).
36. See, e.g., U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California,
General Order No. 394-E (Nov. 8, 1993); Montana Order, supra note 21.
37. See, e.g., E.D. CAL. Loe. R. 253; D. IDAHO Loe. R. 26.1-.2.
38. See Montana Order, supra note 21.
39. See Letter from Paul G. Hatfield, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for
the District of Montana, to members of the Federal Bar Q"an. 25, 1994); see also
D. MONT. Loe. R. 200-205 (governing discovery that became effective on
September 1, 1995).
40. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 322(d)(4), 2071(a), 2071(c)(1) (Supp. 1993); see also FED.
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similar oversight duties to circuit review committees, placing fewer
regulatory responsibilities on them. 41 Although the Ninth Circuit
Court Review Committee rigorously monitored districts'
implementation of the CJRA42 and the Ninth Circuit Judicial
Council attempted to carefully discharge its JIA responsibilities,43
neither Ninth Circuit entity disapproved numerous districts'
adoption of inconsistent automatic disclosure procedures.44
Several plausible reasons explain the Ninth Circuit's inaction.
First, the 1993 Federal Rule revision specifically invited districts to
adopt and enforce conflicting local procedures and even to eschew
totally the federal amendment. 45 Second, the CJRA's eleven
statutorily-prescribed principles, guidelines, and techniques, which
districts were to consider and could promulgate, and the twelfth
provision empowering courts to apply any other measures that
would reduce cost or delay, expressly encouraged districts to
implement local requirements that departed from the Federal Rules
and provisions in the United States Code.46 Third, it is likely that
R. CIV. P. 83 (proscribing inconsistency). See generally Tobias, supra note 1, at
1598-99 (discussing statutory requirements and implementation).
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 474(a) (Supp. 1993); see also Carl Tobias, Civil Justice
Reform and the Balkanization ofFederal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393,
1406-09 (1992) (discussing statutory requirements and implementation of 28
U.S.C. § 474(a)).
42. See Tobias, supra note 41, at 1408 n.78.
43. See Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Review ofLocal Procedures,
52 \XTASH. & LEE L. REV. 359 {1995).
44. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 1, at 1618 n.88 (committee did not disapprove
of inconsistent disclosure procedures); Tobias, supra note 43 (showing that
council did not disapprove of inconsistent disclosure procedures); see also U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sb..-th Circuit, Minutes of the Meeting of the Judicial
Council 4-5 (May 4, 1994) (voting to suspend monitoring of local procedures
under the 1988 Act pending the receipt of additional guidance from Congress,
the Judicial Conference, or case law as to whether the CJRA's provisions take
precedence over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
45. See Amendments, supra note 11, at 431-32.
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. 1993).
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Congress, in assigning oversight duties to committees, failed to
authorize the committees to require that districts abolish or alter
inconsistent procedures. 47
B. State and Territorial Courts

Review of the eleven state and territorial courts in the Ninth
Circuit shows that the Alaska and Arizona state court systems are
the only systems that have adopted automatic disclosure. 48 Indeed,
Arizona prescribed disclosure before the Federal Rule revision
became effective. 49 Procedural policymakers in that state apparently
believed that discovery required such substantial reform that it was
preferable to apply procedures analogous to the comparatively
untested disclosure requirements included in the federal
preliminary draft.so Arizona is also a jurisdiction that has seemingly
concluded that maintaining uniform civil procedures in federal and
state courts is critically important.st The Alaska state court system
seriously considered implementing a form of automatic disclosure
premised on the federal model and formally adopted a disclosure
procedure that became effective on July 15, 1993.s2
It is unclear why the remaining state and territorial court
systems failed to effectuate automatic disclosure. Some jurisdictions
47. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
48. See ARIZ. R. av. P. 26.1, ALA. R. Crv. P. 26; see also Thomas A. Zlaket,
Encouraging Litigators to Be Lawyers: Arizona's New Civil Rules, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1 (1993). California makes limited provision for disclosure. See CAL. CODE Crv.
P. § 1141.11.
49. Arizona's disclosure regime became effective on July 1, 1992 under ARIZ.
R. Crv. P. 26.1, while the federal regime took effect on December 1, 1993.
Compare Robert D. Myers, MAD Track: An Experiment in Terror, 25 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 11 (1993) with Amendments, supra note 11, at 401.
50. See Myers, supra note 49, at 11-13; see also supra note 4 and accompanying
text (discussing federal preliminary draft proposal).
51. See John P. Frank, Local Rules, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2059 (1989).
52. See ALA. R. Crv. P. 26.
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reached no affirmative decision to reject disclosure, while few states
have indicated that they will refuse to employ disclosure. It appears
that most jurisdictions assume a cautious approach to disclosure.
The position of the Montana Advisory Commission on the
Civil Rules, which is the state analogue of the Federal Advisory
Committee, seems typical and perhaps representative.53 The
Commission suggested to the Montana Supreme Court that it delay
the adoption of any disclosure procedure for the state court
system. 54 The Commission premised its view on virtually
unanimous bar opposition to the federal revision and the
amendment's highly controversial nature.55 The Commission
apparently thought that Montana should not prescribe a procedure
that had yet to prove efficacious at the federal level, and that
Montana could always institute disclosure if experimentation in
federal districts and other states indicated that a specific disclosure
mechanism was effective.56

C. A Look at Other Circuits
This survey of automatic disclosure in the Ninth Circuit seems
typical and may well be paradigmatic. An impressionistic review of
most other circuits shows that districts within their purview have
adopted equally disparate approaches to automatic disclosure. For
example, in the Second Circuit, the four New York districts have
prescribed disclosure regimes that are more compatible than those
53. Carl Tobias, An Update on the 1993 Federal Rules Amendments and the
Montana Civil Rules, 56 MONT. L. REV. 547 (1995).
54. Telephone conversation with Randy Cox, Boone, Karlberg & Haddon,
Missoula, MT, Member, Montana Advisory Commission on Civil Rules (Oct.
25, 1994).
55. Remarks of William H. Bellingham, Chair, Montana Advisory
Commission on Civil Rules, to Montana Defense Trial Lawyers Continuing
Legal Education Program on the 1993 Federal Amendments, Kalispell, MT Guly
14, 1994); see also telephone conversation, supra note 54.
56. See Tobias, supra note 53.

1398

THE WAYNELAWREVIEW

[Vol. 41:1385

prescribed in the California districts. 57 Very few state court systems
have correspondingly subscribed to automatic disclosure. Maryland
apparently is the only jurisdiction other than Arizona that has
actually adopted and implemented disclosure. 58
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS REGARDING AUTOMATIC
DISCLOSURE

The Federal Rule amendment imposing automatic disclosure
has significantly enhanced interdistrict court disuniformity. The
applicable disclosure requirements are concomitantly difficult to
find, understand, and satisfy. These phenomena disadvantage all
lawyers and litigants. However, the requirements particularly affect
attorneys and parties, such as the Department of Justice, large
corporations, and the Sierra Club, who litigate in multiple districts
and are located outside specific districts. 59 Even when local
procedural strictures do not mandate the retention of local
counsel, 60 prudence and pragmatic factors may so dictate. For
instance, lawyers who practice in the district may better appreciate
how local judges will actually interpret and enforce disclosure
procedures as written. 61
Disclosure has increased intrastate disuniformity in the Ninth
Circuit because federal districts in the two states that encompass
more than one district prescribe different procedures, while only
two state or territorial systems subscribe to disclosure. The erosion
57. See STIENSTRA, supra note 19, at 8-9, 17-18.
58. See MD. R. CIV. P. 2-403 (1994).
59. See Tobias, supra note 41, at 1422-27; see also Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and
Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 495-98 (1988-89).
60. See Daniel R. Coquillette et al., 7be Role ofLocal Rules, 75 A.B.A. J., Jan.
1989, at 62, 64-65; see also Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987).
61. Lawyers who practice in the district will better understand the local legal
culture. See Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances K. Zemans, Local Legal Culture and
the Control ofLitigation, 27 LAW &SOC'YREV. 535 (1993); see also Tobias, supra
note 41, at 1422-27.
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of uniformity complicates the efforts of attorneys to practice in
both federal and state court in specific jurisdictions and enhances
the complexity and expense of federal and state civil litigation.
Disuniformity also means that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure decreasingly serve as a model for the states. This
phenomenon increasingly undermines the expectations of the
lawyers who drafted the 1938 Federal Ruies. They anticipated that
state court systems would prescribe procedures analogous to
Federal requirements, thereby promoting intrastate uniformity and
simplifying legal practice.62
The reduced uniformity, enhanced complexity, greater
uncertainty, and potential for increased cost and delay that have
apparently attended automatic disclosure's application and other
aspects of the CJRA's implementation have influenced forum
choices in some jurisdictions.63 For instance, plaintiffs' counsel
prefer to pursue litigation in state court because the simpler
requirements expedite resolution. Defense lawyers correspondingly
choose not to remove to federal court suits out of concern about
expense, delay, and complexity.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

A. Generic Recommendation
The above analysis shows that the interdistrict court and
intrastate disuniformity created by the automatic disclosure
procedure has imposed numerous disadvantages. Most important,
disclosure has complicated federal and state civil practice and has
increased cost and delay. These factors lead me to proffer the
62. See Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67
A.B.A. J. 1648, 1650-51 (1981); see also Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the
Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 272-77 {1989).
63. See Carl Tobias, Opt-Outs at the Outlaw Inn: A Report from Montana, 14
REV. LmG. 207, 212 {1994).
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general recommendation that decisionmakers who develop and
apply federal and state civil procedures attempt to implement the
most uniform and simple disclosure requirements. This suggestion
correspondingly prompts more specific recommendations for those
policymakers.

B. Specific Suggestions for Federal Decisionmakers
1. Short-Term Recommendations
Numerous immediate actions that federal procedural decisionmakers could institute must, as a practical matter, await the
conclusion of experimentation under the CJRA and its
comprehensive evaluation. 64 A number of courts that are not
EIDCs have been employing disclosure measures for less than two
years, and relatively little implementation of disclosure in EIDCs
has been rigorously assessed. 65
The RAND Corporation is presently conducting a thorough
analysis of CJRA experimentation with six principles and
guidelines of cost and delay reduction in ten pilot districts and ten
comparison courts which the company plans to complete during
mid-1996. 66 The Judicial Conference will submit to Congress a
64. Insofar as these suggestions are aimed at decisionmakers in the circuits,
they rely on examples drawn from the Ninth Circuit. The recommendations are
intended to apply equally to decisionmakers in other circuits who can
extrapolate from the suggestions.
65. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1614-16; see also infra note 82 and accompanying text.
66. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105(c)(1),
(2)(A)-{C), 104 Stat. 5089, 5098 (1990) (discussing the pilot districts and CJRA
experimentation); see also Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103420, § 4, 108 Stat. 4343, 4345 (1994), reprinted in 3 U.S.C.C.A.N. (1994)
(extending deadline from mid-1995 to mid-1996). See generally Carl Tobias,
Extending the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (1994), 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 105
(1995).
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report and recommendations on that pilot program by the end of
1996,67 while Congress must ultimately decide how to treat the civil
justice reform effort.68 These factors mean that the Advisory
Committee could probably not propose adoption of one disclosure
procedure so soon after the 1993 Federal disclosure amendment's
promulgation, especially given the pragmatic political realities that
require Committee deference to congressional resolution of the
CJRA.
Federal procedural policymakers might institute some actions,
however. Individual federal districts and judges can attempt to
implement and apply the most uniform, simple disclosure regimes.
For example, the federal districts in California and Washington
could make disclosure requirements in the federal courts more
uniform.69 Judges in the Northern District of California might
correspondingly prescribe fewer disclosure systems, although their
efforts may constitute a valuable attempt to experiment with the
procedure in different contexts.70
67. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105{c), supra note 66, at 5098;
see also Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, § 4, supra note 66, at 4345 {extending
deadline from end of 1995 to end of 1996). The Conference must also submit to
Congress a report on the demonstration districts by the end of 1995. See Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, §104(d) supra note 66, at 5097. Congress has extended
the date until the end of 1996. See S. REP. No. 464, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
Neither the Conference's two reports nor the RAND study focus on or
rigorously evaluate disclosure. All three accord disclosure some consideration,
while annual assessments of experimentation in the districts examine disclosure.
These efforts, therefore, may support tentative conclusions regarding disclosure's
efficacy.
68. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105(b) supra note 66, at 509798.
69. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. I recognize that differing
local legal cultures in the districts may suggest the propriety of diverse disclosure
procedures. I also do not underestimate the importance of Article ill judges'
independence as a potential obstacle to changes such as the ones that I suggest.
70. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The need for change may also
be a function of judges' and lawyers' tolerance for experimentation and
inconsistency, both of which have traditionally been rather high in this district
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A general improvement that many federal districts and judges
can easily effectuate is to increase the accessibility of the applicable
disclosure requirements. For instance, courts and judges could
include more disclosure procedures in local rules, or at least explore
ways of effectively communicating the strictures' application to
federal court practitioners and litigants.
The circuit judicial councils and circuit review committees
might promote the adoption of uniform disclosure measures by
abrogating or changing inconsistent local disclosure requirements
or urging federal districts or judges to abolish or modify them. 71
-However, the councils and committees may be justifiably reluctant
to exercise power that appears to be regulatory or to infringe on
federal judges' prerogatives, particularly when the CJRA and the
1993 federal disclosure amendment seem to authorize
inconsistency. 72
The national rule revisors, especially the Advisory Committee,
should begin searching for a single automatic disclosure procedure
that can be included in the Federal Rule as soon as the ongoing
application and analysis of the multitude of disclosure mechanisms
currently receiving experimentation indicate that one technique is
superior. The Committee might draw specifically on the annual
assessments that numerous districts have prepared.73
which enjoys a laudable reputation for experimentation. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT.
R., N.D. CAL., Crv. L.R. 235-37, available in WL CA Rules; see also Robert F.
Peckham, The Federal judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case
from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770, 773-79 (1981).
71. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
73. For example, nearly all of the EIDCs have performed at least one annual
assessment. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
GEORGIA, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CONDITION OF THE COURT'S
DOCK.ET, 1993 WL 52 4466 (C.J.R.A.); U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OI-nO, ANNUALAssESSMENT OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
DOCKET, 1993 WL 319599 (C.J.R.A.); see also 28 U.S.C. § 475 (Supp. 1993)
(prescribing annual assessments).
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Definitive conclusions regarding disclosure's effectiveness are
difficult to posit at this juncture. Nevertheless, it now appears that
the Southern District of Illinois "procedure," requiring litigants to
divulge the identify of persons "reasonably likely to have
information that bears significantly on the claims and defenses," has
worked well.74 The Montana District initially prescribed disclosure
strictures that were intentionally more rigorous than the federal
preliminary draft proposal, mandating, for example, that parties
reveal the factual premise and legal theory of every claim.75 This
procedure seems to function smoothly in comparatively simple,
routine suits and when the disclosure has been general.76
The Judicial Conference should similarly attempt to delineate
one preferable disclosure approach as it continues work on its
report and recommendation to Congress, which will rely
significantly on the RAND Corporation findings. 77 The
Conference should collect, analyze, and synthesize all relevant
information on disclosure's application and evaluation. The annual
assessments performed in EIDCs that adopted disclosure should be
a helpful source.
'
Although it is difficult to reach conclusive determinations
respecting disclosure's efficacy, educated predictions can be
premi~ed on experimentation and analysis to date. This material
suggests that the Conference will recommend national adoption of
74. See U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IilINOIS,
CIVILJUSTICEDELAY AND EXPENSE REDUCTION PLAN 11, 1991WL525127

(C.J.R.A.); see also Rooney, supra note 21, at 17.
75. See U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA, supra note
5, at 16-17 (1991); see also Carl Tobias, More on Federal Civil Justice Reform in
Montana, 54 MONT. L. REV. 357, 363 (1993); supra notes 29, 38-39 and
accompanying text.
76. See Tobias, supra note 75, at 363. Unfortunately, discovery poses the
greatest difficulty and requires the most effective reform in complex cases. See
Winter, supra note 1, at 268.
77. See Tobias, supra note 66, at 20; see also supra notes 66-67 and
accompanying text.
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the disclosure procedure that has proved most effective at that
time. 78 If the data assembled, evaluated, and synthesized between
now and the date when the Conference must report to Congress is
inconclusive, the Conference should consider developing other
alternatives, such as limited additional testing of those disclosure
mechanisms that seem most efficacious.79
Congress can continue planning for the Judicial Conference's
submission of the report and recommendation in anticipation of
legislative decisionmaking relating to the CJRA. However,
Congress may need to await the results of the RAND study and the
Conference report and recommendation before it can meaningfully
treat disclosure. For instance, the above examination indicated that
the Conference would probably propose nationwide prescription
of a single disclosure procedure. 80 Should the information that
subsequently becomes available suggest the propriety of this
approach, Congress should ratify it. If the material indicates
otherwise or is less clear, thereby leading the Conference to
different conclusions, the Congress should examine additional
courses of action, including selective, future experimentation with
promising disclosure techniques.
Congress might also consider measures that it can immediately
institute to increase automatic disclosure's uniformity and
simplicity, although Congress apparently has few such options.
Congress should forgo the revival of the legislation that would have
omitted disclosure from the 1993 Federal Rules amendments. 81
Revitalization is inadvisable and would prove counterproductive
principally because it will disrupt ongoing experimentation before
more definitive conclusions regarding disclosure's effectiveness can
be formulated.
78. See also Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105(c), supra note 66, at
5098 (prescribing similar process for Conference recommendation).
79. See supra note 78; see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 1627-28.
80. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
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Finally, all procedural decisionmakers should explore ways of
rigorously evaluating experimentation with automatic disclosure.
Numerous annual assessments have discussed disclosure, but few
analyses have been particularly stringent, and a number have
yielded inconclusive results respecting efficacy.82 The RAND study
has not emphasized disclosure, and some of the pilot and
comparison districts are not even applying the mechanism. 83 The
Congress or the Judicial Conference might commission RAND to
expand its evaluation, thereby focusing more specifically on
disclosure, or the Conference could charge the Federal Judicial
Center to perform an assessment of disclosure.

2. Long-Term Recommendations
Several long-term suggestions can be derived from the
experimentation with automatic disclosure, although most of the
recommendations are not specific to that procedure. Federal
districts and individual judges must be attentive to the
complications of procedural inconsistency that disclosure
exemplifies. For example, the courts and judges should abrogate all
conflicting local procedures, embody the maximum number of
remaining requirements in local rules, and commit to writing every
local procedure. 84 Circuit judicial councils should systematically
discharge their duties to periodically review, abolish, or alter any
local procedures deemed inconsistent. 85 This suggestion realistically
82. The first assertion is premised on my review of most of the assessments.
Examples of inconclusive results appear in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
GROUP OF 1HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 1HE EASTERN DISTRICT
OFPENNSYLVANIA6-8Q"une1993); REPORTON1HE!MPACTOFTHECOST AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN ADOPTED BY 1HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THESOU1HERNDISTRICTOFTEXAS 13-17 (Apr. 6, 1993), 1993 WL 468314
(C.J.R.A.).
83. See supra note 66.
84. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1626-28; Tobias, supra note 63, nn.217-18.
85. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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applies to council review of procedures prescribed under the CJRA
only after the CJRA has sunset and to disclosure only in the longterm. 86
The national rule revisers, particularly the Advisory
Committee, should attempt to reinstitute a national uniform
procedural system. Significant to the achievement of this objective
will be the substitution of a proposed 1991 revision to Rule 83,
which was retracted in deference to civil justice reform
experimentation, for the local option provision that automatic
dis~losure specifically illustrates. 87
The national revision entities must also be more cautious about
developing controversial Federal Rules amendments such as
automatic disclosure. The disclosure experience indicates that state
court policymakers will be reluctant to adopt similar measures until
they exhibit promise. The national rule revisers should prescribe
procedural changes only after thorough experimentation and
rigorous evaluation through empirical data collection that shows
that the mechanisms are efficacious. 88 The national entities should
correspondingly create a more effective vehicle for conducting
experimentation that could be premised on the recently withdrawn

86. For explanations of why the suggestion only applies to disclosure in the
long-term, see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (explaining why
suggestion only applies to councils after CJRA sunsets). Numerous councils may
also require congressional funding to implement this aspect of the 1988 JIA. See
Tobias, supra note 43, at 364.
87. The proposal empowered districts with Judicial Conference approval to
adopt for not greater than five years experimental local rules which contravene
Federal Rules. See Judicial Conference of the U.S. Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, Preliminary Draft ofProposedAmendments to the Federal
Rules ofCivil Procedure and the Federal Rules ofEvidence, reprinted in 137 F.R.D.
53, 152 (1991); see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 1630-32; Bell et al., supra note 2,
at 35-39. But see Winter, supra note 1, at 269.
88. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1630-32; see also Stephen B. Burbank, The

Transfonnation ofAmerican Civil Procedure: The Example ofRule 11, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1925, 1927-28 (1989).
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proposal to amend Rule 83. 89
C. Specific Suggestions for State Decisionmakers

State court procedural decisionmakers considering disclosure
apparently have few tenable options.9° For example, the
policymakers can adopt the controversial federal disclosure
provision that has not yet proved efficacious, prescribe no
disclosure procedure, or experiment with disclosure measures that
depart from the federal requirements. The two latter alternatives
would increase intrastate disuniformity, except in jurisdictions that
model their disclosure requirements on those of the federal districts
located therein.
Some state court systems may want to undertake
experimentation with disclosure. These jurisdictions should survey
the different procedures being applied throughout the federal
system, assess their own local legal cultures, and ascertain which
measures promise to be most effective. The states should also
remember the disclosure procedures applied by the federal districts
in the jurisdiction and attempt to conform state requirements
closely to the federal strictures. States that are uncertain about those
disclosure procedures that will be most efficacious could prescribe
selective experimentation in speCific local courts or by particular
case types. 91 States should also institute rigorous evaluation of any
experimentation initiated so that the best mechanisms can
ultimately be identified.92
89. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1630-32. See generally A. Leo Levin, Local
Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division ofPower, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567
{1991); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted
Field Expe-timents, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67.
90. Because they have so few choices, I have combined short- and long-term
suggestions.
91. For instance, experimentation with disclosure might be more appropriate
in urban or rural districts or in simple or complex cases.
92. See supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also supra note 65 and
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VI. CONCLUSION

This study of automatic disclosure in the Ninth Circuit
indicates that the procedure promoted interdistrict court and
intrastate disuniformity. Institutions and individuals, such as
Congress, the Federal Advisory Committee, federal districts and
judges, and state judges who are responsible for maintaining civil
procedures that are uniform and simple, must now act
expeditiously and effectively to limit the disuniformity that ·
disclosure is fostering.

accompanying text. Federal and state procedural decisionmakers should probably
employ federal-state judicial councils as vehicles for cooperating and for
increasing intrastate uniformity of disclosure and other civil procedures.

